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1. Introduction 
 
 
For the early French Revolutionaries, the concept of the nation did not 
serve as a vehicle for territorial states’ exclusionist practices. Neither did they 
conceive of national identity primarily as a criterion by which to distinguish 
between “us” and “them”. For them, the concept of the nation gave expression to 
the radical idea of an inclusive political community based the concept of popular 
sovereignty, equality and unalienable rights. However, the territoriality of global 
political organisation led to a different role for nationalism on the global political 
stage than which could have been foreseen by the early Revolutionaries. 
Contemporary nationalism is defined by the very distinction between “us” and 
“them” and its original promise of individual rights and freedoms often seems to 
be in direct contradiction with everyday reality. I will argue below that the reason 
for this has to be sought at least partly in the process of territorialisation. 
Territorialisation, a process that links political authority to clearly delimited space, 
has led to the notion of sovereignty as an abstraction that links state, people, 
identity and territory in a way that is presented as natural and inextricable. 
National citizenship is thus seen as the primary political identity, while the 
adjective national has simultaneously acquired a pre-political aureole on account 
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of stubborn myths of the shared blood and history of the “people” that underpin 
the concept of popular sovereignty. As a result, the territorially fixed population 
has become one of the foundations of the concept of sovereignty. Consequently, 
the modern state guards its territorial boundaries jealously and strictly, especially 
with regard to the movement of persons, because “when the rules for 
differentiating between the inside and the outside become blurred and ambiguous, 
the foundations of sovereignty become shaky.”1 
It is sometimes argued that the fundamental status of the territorial/nation 
state and its citizens in the global political system is changing. According to this 
view, sovereign states are increasingly limited in their use of territorial borders to 
maintain a strict divide between “inside” and “outside”; “us” and “them”. As a 
result, a post-Westphalian constellation is slowly developing of which allegedly 
post-national political entities such as the European Union offer the best 
example.2 However, there are also scholars who have described an opposite trend 
over the last decades and who claim that globalisation has forced states to think of 
novel ways to protect traditional borders, both of territory and of community.3 In 
the specific European context, it has for example been argued that national states 
have shifted high politics as immigration policy making upwards to the EU in 
order to circumvent national policy constraints as have been formulated by 
domestic judiciaries.4 It has also been said that national “concerns to maintain and 
protect borders of work, welfare and citizenship” have shaped EU policy making 
                                                 
1 R. Doty, ‘Sovereignty and the nation: constructing the boundaries of national identity’, in: The 
social construction of state sovereignty, T.J. Biersteker and C. Weber (eds.), Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press; 1996; pp. 121-147, at 122. 
2 The EU has thus been called a “post-national entity” (J. Habermas, The Postnational 
Constellation, Cambridge: MIT Press; 2001; and D. Curtin, Postnational Democracy: The 
European Union in Search of a Political Philosophy, The Hague: Kluwer Law International; 1997) 
and the “first truly post-modern international form” (J. Ruggie, Territoriality and Beyond: 
Problematizing Modernity in International Relations, International Organization 47(1), 1993, pp. 
137-174.) 
3 Both positions do not necessarily exclude but may also complement each other, as is shown by 
the work of for example Saskia Sassen. 
4 V. Guiraudon, ‘European integration and migration policy making: Vertical policy-making as 
venue shopping’, Journal of Common Market Studies 38(2), 2000, pp. 251-271. 
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in this area,5 and that instead of the emergence of a post-national approach that 
departs from the usual (national) discourse that portrays immigration first and 
foremost as implicating territorial sovereignty and a threat to the unity and 
identity of the body politic, “Member States’ own discourse on the securitization 
of migration and asylum policy” is simply copied at the EU level.6 
Indeed, the argument that instead of ceding sovereignty, European States aim 
at enhancing national sovereign power by resorting to supranational law making 
in the area of immigration of third-country nationals is not a new one.7 This paper 
seeks to deepen the understanding of such a perspective on European integration 
in this specific policy area. In the first place, by addressing the relationship 
between immigration, territorial borders, and conceptions of sovereign power, it 
will shed much needed light on what the very sovereign power that individual 
Member States allegedly wish to preserve is about. 
In the second place, this paper describes the implications of Member States’ 
inability to think beyond the national sovereign paradigm on the legal regime 
regulating immigration of third-country nationals within and into Europe. We will 
see that Member States’ desire to preserve the traditional function of the national 
territorial border within Europe – despite their formal commitment to establishing 
an area without internal frontiers – has led to ambiguity in the separation of 
powers between the EU and its Member States. Similarly, European integration 
with regard to policies concerning immigration into the EU show that the driving 
                                                 
5 A. Geddes, ‘Europe’s Border Relationships and International Migration Relations’, Journal of 
Common Market Studies 43(4), 2005, pp. 787-806. 
6 T. Kostakopoulou, ‘The ‘Protective Union’: Change and Continuity in Migration Law and Policy 
in Post-Amsterdam Europe’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 38(3), pp. 497-518, 2000, at 
508. 
7 See in addition to the literature cited above: G. Lahav, Immigration and Politics in the New 
Europe, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2004 and G. Freeman, ‘The Decline of 
Sovereignty? Politics and Immigration Restrictions in Liberal States’, in: Challenge to the Nation 
State: Immigration in Western Europe and the United States, C. Joppke (ed.), Oxford: Oxford 
University Press; 1998. Rey Koslowski argues differently and sees the deepening and widening 
integration in migration policy-making as indicative of major future transfers of sovereignty.” R. 
Koslowski, ‘Personal security and state sovereignty in a uniting Europe’, in: Controlling a New 
Migration World, V. Guiraudon and C. Joppke (eds.), London and New York: Routledge;  2001, p. 
99-116. 
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force behind integration in this area is provided by a wish to safeguard the 
intrinsically national link between territorial exclusion and the other. And 
although European integration in this area may thus be seen as a way in which 
individual Member States attempt to maintain the traditional role of territorial 
boundaries in protecting what is perceived as the identity of the body politic, 
obdurate conceptions of the relation between sovereignty and immigration in an 
integrating Europe have simultaneously necessitated the emergence of novel ways 
to regulate human mobility. The overall result of the self-evidence with which the 
link between the foreigner and territorial exclusion has been retained in Europe 
has made the movement rights of third-country nationals subject to a legal 
framework that is unnecessarily complicated and contradictory, and which, in 
important respects, fails to live up to the demands of the rule of law. 
 
 
2. Territorial Sovereignty, the Nation-State and Exclusion 
 
According to Andrew Geddes, territorial borders are “typically understood 
as the sites at which the sovereign authority of the state to exclude is exercised”.8 
However, territorial borders are not only sites where the sovereign power to 
exclude comes most clearly (and often most brutally) to the fore. In addition, and 
perhaps more fundamentally, they have also played a central role in the 
development of modern sovereignty whose function it is to distinguish the inside 
from the outside. As such, they have determined the particular way in which this 
inside and outside have been constructed by establishing a seemingly self-evident 
relation between sovereignty and modern concepts of nation and identity. Indeed, 
territorialisation, the process by which political authority came to be linked to 
clearly demarcated territorial units, profoundly influenced the way in which the 
modern state conceives of identity and political community. An inquiry in the 
relationship between territorial borders, immigration and sovereignty is much 
needed in a political climate where the exclusion of “outsiders” is increasingly 
perceived as both natural and justified on account of the state’s territorial 
sovereignty. 
                                                 
8 Geddes (2005), op.cit., p. 788. 
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Contemporary political discourse portrays the right to control the entry and 
stay of non-nationals as inherent in the state’s sovereign claims over its territory. 
The link between immigration and notions of territorial sovereignty is most 
explicit in right-wing populist discourse – now common in all EU Member States 
– that adopts a rhetoric of “threat”, “crisis”, and “invasion” to address problems 
associated with immigration. But also more mainstream approaches by policy 
makers and judiciaries disclose a view that does not doubt the legality of the 
national state’s claim to exclude non-nationals on account of its territorial 
sovereignty, albeit presently subject to some exceptions based on human rights 
obligations of the state. Such a view seems to be largely derived from the notion 
of the inviolability of territorial boundaries in classical international law, a 
discourse almost exclusively about the rights and duties of states towards each 
other and in which the interests of the individual as such did not feature.9 The 
preponderance of powerful claims by the state that are derived from its territorial 
sovereignty on the legal regime of immigration control is exacerbated by the 
current trend in which immigration is increasingly portrayed as a security issue.10 
The contemporary discourse of societal security draws likewise from the 
vernacular of the “invading enemy”11, traditionally reserved for war and other 
threats to the territorial integrity of the modern state in the past. 
An approach to the right to regulate immigration that draws so directly 
from a legal discourse in which the sanctity of territorial boundaries is paramount 
could only come about as a result of a perception in which individuals’ 
relationships to territory are static and in which each and everyone of them 
                                                 
9 The discourse that addresses immigration as engaging first and foremost territorial sovereignty to 
which the state has an absolute claim originates from the way in which international law addresses 
armed conflict between sovereign states and dates from the late 18th century. See for example the 
U.S Supreme Court in the Chinese Exclusion Case: “to preserve its independence, and give 
security against foreign aggression and encroachment, is the highest duty of every nation, and to 
attain these ends nearly all other considerations are to be subordinated. It matters not in what 
form such aggression and encroachment come, whether from the foreign nation acting in its 
national character or from vast hordes of its people crowding in upon us” (Chae Chan Ping v. 
United States (1889), p. 606). 
10 See J. Huysmans, ‘The European Union and the Securitization of Migration’, Journal of 
Common Market Studies. 38(5), pp. 751-777, 2000. 
11 Id., at 757. 
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belongs to a certain, clearly demarcated piece of the earth.12 According to such a 
perception, migration poses a problem to both the territorial state and the global 
political system based on territoriality, which therefore needs to be prevented and 
contained by the use of violent dissuasive measures and in which there is little 
awareness of the manifold ways in which individuals relate to territory.13 
However, it is important to keep in mind that extensive exercise of the right to 
regulate immigration by the state is a relatively recent phenomenon, and the 
allegedly classical perspective that the right to exclude aliens is an essential 
attribute of territorial sovereignty may well be a “late nineteenth century 
artefact”.14 Whence then the contemporary “need for territorial sedentarization”, 
for “fixed concentrations of populations”?15 
In order to understand the intricate relation between territory, sovereignty 
and notions of identity, belonging, inside and outside, one needs to go back to the 
consolidation of exclusive territorial rule in Europe during the sixteenth and 
seventeenth century. It was around that time that the state began to be perceived 
as a unified force, with supreme and exclusive authority over the population 
within a certain territory.16 Monarchical struggles for power had led to the 
breakdown of the medieval Christian order and territorial boundaries had 
gradually been drawn. Territory started to play a bigger role in political life, but 
initially the feudal perception that relations of authority were of a personal 
character, remained. Formally, people belonged to the body politic (embodied by 
the King) by virtue of their being subjected to the sovereign, and not because they 
                                                 
12 See Barry Hindess who argues that such an international police of populations is brought about 
by citizenship. B. Hindess, ‘Citizenship in the international management of populations’, 
American Behavioral Scientist 43(9), 2000, pp. 1486-1497 and B. Hindess, ‘Divide and Rule: The 
International Character of Modern Citizenship’, European Journal of Social Theory 1(1),  pp. 57-
70, 1998. 
13 See F. Düvell, Illegal immigration: What to do about it. Working Paper. Working Group 
Migration-Mobility-Minorities-Membership, Florence, EUI/RSCAS. 2004, at. 9. 
14 D. Martin, ‘Effects of International Law on Migration Policy and Practice: The Uses of 
Hypocrisy’, International Migration Review 23(3), 1989, pp. 547-578at 547. 
15 G. Procacci, ‘Social economy and the government of poverty’, in: The Foucault Effect: Studies 
in Governmentality, G. Burchell, C. Gordon and P. Miller (eds.), Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press; 1991, at 161. 
16 R. Plender, International Migration Law, Leiden: Sijthof; 1972 at 10. 
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had a special relation with each other or with the territory in which they lived. 
Indeed, ideologies such as nationalism, alluding to a deeper (and allegedly more 
profound) relationship between people, territory and the body politic, were not yet 
conceivable. In practice, however, territorialisation had led to a situation in which 
the people over whom the sovereign ruled were defined by virtue of their location 
within certain borders.17 This situation became a structural aspect of political 
organisation after 1648, the year when the Peace of Westphalia, by establishing 
external sovereignty as a principle of international relations, ascribed to each 
territorial state the exclusive government of the population within its territory.18 
Thus, territorialisation of political organisation had largely become a fact 
by the time that the predominant mode of legitimising political authority consisted 
in an appeal to the sovereignty of the people. Indeed, the very process of 
territorialisation made possible the emergence of a notion as abstract as popular 
sovereignty: its very abstraction one of the characteristics that distinguished 
popular sovereignty from earlier theories by which men had attempted to 
legitimise political authority. A new idea was needed to imagine the novel idea of 
the body politic governed by the people, just as a new political identity had to be 
devised to give expression to political equality. The nation became the all-
compassing political entity that was the source of sovereignty and equality, and 
citizenship indicated membership in the political community called the nation.19  
However, the insidious result of the fact that the notion of popular 
sovereignty came to be executed in a system of separate and independent political 
entities, demarcated by way of territorial borders, was that the enlightenment 
ideals on which the concept of the people was based quickly lost their 
universalistic connotations of a common humanity. Instead, they transformed into 
a particularistic conception of the nation constituted by the people whose bonds to 
each other were supposedly pre-political. The very survival of a political system 
                                                 
17 D. Philpott, ‘Ideas and the evolution of sovereignty’, in: State Sovereignty: Change and 
Persistence in International Relations, S.H. Hashmi (ed.), Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State 
University Press; 1997, at 19. 
18 Hindess (1998) op. cit., p. 65. 
19 See M.P. Fitzsimmons, ‘The National Assembly and the Invention of Citizenship’, in: The 
French Revolution and the Meaning of Citizenship, R. Waldinger, P. Dawson, and I. Woloch 
(eds.), Westport, London: Greenwood Press; 1993; pp. 29-41 
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in which loyalty was no longer required to the King, but to an anonymous and 
abstract multitude called the people would perhaps not have been possible without 
an appeal that went deeper than that intangible notion of the people who were 
only united because they were subject to common government within a certain 
territory.20 The mobilising myth of nationalism, implying a pre-political identity 
of the territorially defined “people” was able to fill the gap that existed between 
the abstract notion of popular sovereignty and the actualities of a political system 
based on territoriality. That a universalistic ethic came thus to be construed in 
what had become by then the particularistic language of nation and national 
citizenship was caused by the fact that it was not within a universal empire but 
within the territorial state that enlightenment ideals were politically translated. 
Accordingly, the interplay between territorialisation and liberal theory had 
led to the formation of exclusive political identities by the time that the 
Napoleonic wars had swept over Europe. Romanticism buttressed the perception 
according to which sovereignty, territory and the identity of the body politic were 
inextricably tied together so that their linkage had acquired a halo of necessity and 
naturalness by the end of the nineteenth century. People were defined by virtue of 
to which state they belonged and this period saw the introduction of racially, 
culturally and socially exclusive immigration laws. Territorial sovereignty was put 
forward as inherently entailing the power to exclude foreigners, characterised by 
extensive executive discretion with little or no room for the legislative or judiciary 
powers. During the course of the twentieth century we have witnessed an ever 
more progressive assertion of territorial sovereignty in the legal regime of 
immigration control. And although the modern human rights discourse has made 
some inroads in the state’s sovereign claims in this area, most clearly illustrated 
by the rights of long-term legal residents in liberal democracies,21 contemporary 
practices as immigration detention and deportation of those individuals that are 
                                                 
20 See J. Habermas, ‘The European Nation-State: On the Past and Future of Sovereignty and 
Citizenship’, Public Culture, 10(10) 1998, pp. 397-416. 
21 See C. Joppke, ‘Why Liberal States Accept Unwanted Immigration’, World Politics. 1998; 
50(2):266-293; Y. Soysal, Limits of Citizenship, Chigaco: University of Chicago Press; 1994; and 
S. Sassen, ‘The Repositioning of Citizenship’, in: People out of Place: Globalization, Human 
Rights and the Citizenship Gap, A. Brysk and G. Shafir, London and New York: Routledge; 2004. 
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labelled as “illegal” show that the right as such of the nation state to exclude 
foreigners is not questioned. 
Nonetheless, although the legal claims to regulate immigration are 
justified with an appeal to the modern state’s territorial sovereignty, the 
importance that states attach to the territorial ideal is different from and goes far 
deeper than the mere wish to maintain independent sovereign units. Apart from 
exclusive and ultimate political authority within a certain demarcated territory,22 
the territorial ideal entails the homogenisation of these territorial units: by 
invoking their sovereign power, states thus seek to protect what Catherine 
Dauvergne has called their “nation’s nationness”.23 
And for those who do not question the contemporary political discourse in 
which the link between territorial exclusion and the foreigner is presented as 
natural and to a certain extent even unavoidable, it is perhaps useful to be 
reminded of the fact that the ideology of nationalism has also generated other 
modes of territorial exclusion, that is to say, of those belying a different identity 
within the nation state.24 The fact that practices such as the expulsion of religious 
minorities, population transfers based on ethnicity, and transportation of criminal 
citizens have become prohibited by modern human rights law, while the territorial 
exclusion of foreigners remains legitimate merely with an appeal to the territorial 
sovereignty of the nation state, reinforces the claim that the contemporary attitude 
towards immigration is decisively influenced by the classical legal discourse that 
                                                 
22 Which can indeed be had by a state that adheres to an open admissions policy. 
23 C. Dauvergne, ‘Sovereignty, Migration and the Rule of Law in Global Times’, The Modern Law 
Review 67(4) 2000, pp. 588-615 at 595. See also John Crowley who distinguishes between 
immigrants and visitors and argues that “to immigrate […] is to attain a certain kind of status with 
respect both to a society and to a jurisdiction, which are related to a territory but not exhaustively 
defined by it.” J. Crowley, ‘Locating Europe’ in: In Search of Europe’s Borders, K. Groenendijk, 
E. Guild en P. Minderhout (eds.), The Hague: Kluwer Law International; 2003, pp. 27-44, at 33. 
24 William Walters denaturalises the link between deportation and the foreigner by providing a 
historical and genealogical analysis of deportation. See W. Walters, ‘Deportation, Expulsion, and 
the International Police of Aliens’, Citizenship Studies. 6(3) 2002, pp. 256-292. 
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regards territorial borders as sacrosanct and that clings to the illusion of the 
territorially defined nation state as a closed container of society.25 
In such a discourse there is little room for articulation of the individual 
interests that are actually implicated in the dominant perception of territorial 
sovereignty. The fact that modern international law has delegitimised historical 
forms of territorial exclusion while it has simultaneously naturalised the link 
between such exclusion and foreign nationals serves to highlight the distinction 
that has been made within the concept of sovereignty by the modern rule of law: 
while it has increasingly offered ways in which to hold accountable the 
jurisdictional content of sovereign power whenever that is exercised over a well-
defined group of people within a certain clearly demarcated territory, it has 
largely remained indifferent whenever the state presents the exercise of its power 
as based on sovereignty’s territorial form. 
 
 
3. Third-Country Nationals and European Integration: the Paradox of 
the “Abolished” Internal Border 
 
The way in which the modern state appeals to its territorial sovereignty in 
order to exclude the foreigner may thus be one of the clearest examples of the 
“pervasive institutionalization of nationhood in the practice of states and our state 
system”.26 How then does the European Union feature in a world where questions 
regarding the movement of people are for a very large part determined by the 
national quality of both persons and territory? Have the abolition of internal 
frontiers within Europe and the establishment of free movement rights changed 
notions of belonging, sovereignty, and territoriality so as to be able to say that 
Europe has moved beyond the organization of political space along the lines of 
national sovereignty? I will argue that policy making with regard to movement 
rights of third-country nationals into and within the EU shows that the Member 
                                                 
25 See J. Agnew and S. Corbridge, Mastering space. Hegemony, territory and international 
political economy, London: Routledge; 1995 at 82-92 about perceptions of the nation state as a 
“container of society”. 
26 R. Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1996, at 21. 
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States have not seized the opportunity provided by the process of European 
integration to reflect seriously on post-national conceptions of political 
community. This is so because, notwithstanding the fact that notions of inside and 
outside within Europe may have been shifting in important – and perhaps 
unprecedented – ways as a result of the establishment of the internal market and 
integration in more general terms, the legal regime regulating movement by third-
country nationals across both external and internal borders remains for a large part 
moulded according to traditional conceptions of the link between national 
sovereignty and territorial exclusion of the individual who is defined as the other.  
In section 3.1., I will address the free movement rights of third-country 
nationals in the ‘area without internal frontiers’ in order to show that the internal 
border is far from being abolished in Europe. In this section, specific attention 
will be paid to the Chen case because the UK government’s contentions in that 
case provide an excellent example of a Member State’s strategic – albeit disguised 
– use of the national sovereign paradigm as soon as it perceives an endangering of 
the link between territorial exclusion and the foreigner as a result of European 
integration. Furthermore, this Section will pay attention to the current confusion 
that surrounds the precise extent of the movement rights that third-country 
nationals may enjoy in their quality as family members of EU citizens. We will 
see that recent case law of the ECJ shows that the precise delimitation of 
competences between the EU and its Member States in this area is far from clear, 
resulting in unnecessarily complicated and contradictory case law by the ECJ. 
After that, in section 3.2., I will focus on the common immigration policy 
and the crossing of external borders. Instead of analysing the bulk of legislation 
that has been enacted under Title IV of the EC Treaty, I will investigate if and 
how EU law and policy-making in this area has changed traditional 
understandings of territoriality, sovereignty and exclusion. And although we will 
see that certain changes have indeed occurred, I will argue that these changes have 
mostly been triggered by Member States’ wishes to strengthen the kind of 
sovereign power that they deem necessary for protecting precisely that what is 
defined by the internal border.  
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3.1. Free Movement of Third-Country Nationals in an Area without 
Internal Frontiers 
 
The Treaty of Rome of 1957 enlisted as one of the objectives of the 
Community, the abolition, as between Member States, of obstacles to the freedom 
of movement of goods, persons, services and capital, which objective was closely 
linked with the establishment of the common market.27 The Single European Act 
of 1987 set the deadline of achieving what had by then been renamed the internal 
market, as an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, 
persons, services and capital was to be ensured by 1992. The definition of the 
internal market in what is now Article 14 EC Treaty thus consists of two 
elements, both of which touch directly upon the rights of movement of third-
country nationals. The first element, the absence of internal frontiers – denoting 
the absence of all frontier controls on all persons, be they citizens of the Union or 
nationals of third countries28 - is related to “flanking measures with respect to 
external border controls, asylum and immigration”29, for the adoption of which 
Community competence was created by the Treaty of Amsterdam, as we will see 
in the Section below. The second element consists of the realisation of free 
movement of persons. In contrast to the abolition of frontier controls, which does 
not distinguish nationals of EU Member States from third-country nationals, 
Community law concerning free movement rights sets these two categories clearly 
apart, and third-country nationals only benefit from freedom of movement in a 
way that could be described as indirect and partial. 
While EU citizens benefit from extensive freedom of movement rights 
between the Member States, the Treaty provisions on freedom of movement are 
not applicable to third-country nationals as such. It is important to note that other 
fields of EC law are much more inclusive of third-country nationals, such as the 
rules on free movement of capital or transfer of undertakings, consumer law and 
transport policy, and rules regarding working conditions and social security 
                                                 
27 Article 3(c) EEC Treaty. 
28 Article 62 EC Treaty. 
29 Article 61 EC Treaty. 
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schemes.30 It should also be underlined that the exclusion of third country 
nationals from the scope of free movement rights is not apparent from the way in 
which these rights are formulated in primary community law. Article 39 EC 
Treaty uses the term “workers” without reference to the nationality of these 
workers.  Nevertheless, right from the beginning, the nationality limitation was 
applied by the Member States, which was approved of by the Court of Justice.31 
The assertion of exclusionary powers per se is no longer deemed necessary, nor 
legitimate, with regard to EU citizens, but national states wished to keep their 
discretionary powers with regard to entry and sojourn of third-country nationals 
largely in their own hands.  
Council Directive 2003/109/EC32 on the status of third-country nationals 
who are long-term residents has somewhat rectified this situation, but substantive 
differences between EU citizens and third-country nationals remain. Most 
significant in this respect is that Member States retain the final power of deciding 
on whom to confer long-term resident status through the possibility of requiring 
integration requirements in accordance with national laws.33 As a result, instead 
of a European status that is beyond the national, long-term resident status is 
ultimately a status that can be made contingent on the national state’s notion of its 
“nationness”. It is worth mentioning that this situation is reinforced by the Reform 
Treaty, seeing that it explicitly excludes any harmonisation of laws concerning 
integration of third-country nationals.34 In addition, Directive 2003/109 gives host 
Member States the possibility of restricting free movement rights of those who are 
in possession of long-term resident status on the grounds of economic 
                                                 
30 S. Boelaert-Suominen, ‘Non-EU nationals and Council Directive 2003/109/EC on the status of 
Third Country Nationals who are long-term residents: Five paces forward and possibly three paces 
back’,  Common Market Law Review 42(3) 2005, pp. 1011-1052, at 1014. 
31 Case 238/83, Caisse d'Allocations Familiales de la Région Parisienne v Mr and Mrs Richard 
Meade, 5 July 1984. 
32 O.J. 2004, L 16/44.  
33 Article 5(2) of Council Directive 2003/109/EC. 
34 Article 69b paragraph 4. 
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considerations,35 whereas economic ends are explicitly excluded from the public 
policy exceptions to the freedom of movement and residence of EU citizens.36 
‘Supranational’ policies of abolishment of internal borders thus seem to be 
acceptable to the Member States only if the national state is able to maintain and 
control its linkage of population and territory, if not in a formal sense, than at least 
in reality. In this respect, it should be underlined that in the past the Commission 
has been in favour of extending free movement rights for third-country nationals, 
motivated with the very argument that freedom of movement for economic 
activities was not as widely used by the nationals of Member States as would be 
desirable for internal market purposes. The still vivid image of national 
sovereignty as ultimate territorial control in order to protect their “nation’s 
nationness” is affirmed by the (temporary) reservations that many Member States 
have made with regard to the free movement rights of the new EU citizens in 
Central and Eastern Europe.37 
The Chen Case provides an excellent example of Member States’ strategic 
use of the concept of national sovereignty when it comes to the free movement 
rights of third-country nationals.38 Legislation pertaining to nationality has been 
held firmly within their sovereign prerogatives,39 while the issue of free 
                                                 
35 Article 14(3) of Council Directive 2003/109/EC. 
36 See Article 27 of Directive 2004/58/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family 
members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation 
(EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 
75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC. 
37 The Accession treaties contain provisions that make it possible to make transitional 
arrangements with regard to the free movement rights for the new EU citizens. For five years 
following the accession of new Member States, access to the labour markets of current Member 
States may depend on national measures and policies, as well as bilateral agreements they may 
have with the new Member States. After five years, the possibility exists for a current Member 
State to ask the Commission for authorisation to continue to apply national measures for a further 
two years, but only if it is experiencing serious disturbances on its labour market. See “Free 
Movement After Enlargement” at http://europa.eu. 
38 ECJ, Case C-200/02, Chen Kunqian Catherine Zhu and Man Lavette Chen v. Secretary of State 
for the Home Department, 19 October 2004. 
39 See the Declaration on nationality of a Member State attached to the final Act of the Treaty on 
European Union, OJ C 191 29/07/92: “The Conference declares that, wherever in the Treaty 
establishing the European Community reference is made to nationals of the Member States, the 
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movement rights for EU citizens is within the competence of the EC. As EU 
citizenship is only conferred on those who are nationals of one of the Member 
States, individual member states retain the power to decide who can benefit from 
free movement rights. It has been remarked that their interest in preserving their 
prerogative over recognition of citizenship status is indicative of their will to 
retain crucial elements of sovereign statehood.40 However, the reverse side of that 
coin is that they have to respect other Member States’ decisions in this area 
equally.  
The Chen case showed that such an approach to EU citizenship is not 
always in the interest of an individual Member State wishing to preserve its 
ultimate powers to exclude. Catherine Chen was born in Belfast, whereupon she 
acquired Irish nationality.41 Her Chinese mother went to England with her 
(without having to cross any international border), where she held a temporary 
residence permit as her husband was engaged in business between England and 
China. The ECJ decided that as an EU citizen, Catherine Chen had the right to 
reside in any Member State, under the usual conditions laid down in secondary 
legislation. As her right of residence would be illusionary without her mother to 
take care of her, her mother acquired such a right of residence as well. The 
judgment by the ECJ is no more than the result of a consistent application of 
established principles of EC law on the legal status of EU citizens.  
And indeed, much more than in the outcome of the proceedings, the 
significance of this case for the topic under consideration here lies in the 
arguments that were presented by the UK government in the proceedings. In the 
first place, the UK raised an objection of inadmissibility: as the appellants had 
never exercised the freedom of movement granted to them by the Treaty – seeing 
that they never left the United Kingdom to go to another Member State – there 
would be no foreign elements of such a kind as to render Community law 
                                                                                                                                     
question whether an individual possesses the nationality of a Member State shall be settled solely 
by reference to the national law of the Member State concerned.” 
40 See A. Dashwood, ‘States in the European Union’, European Law Review, 23, 1998, pp. 201-
216 at 203; and E. Kveinen, ‘Citizenship on a Post-Westphalian Community: Beyond External 
Exclusion?’, Citizenship Studies. 2002; 6(1):21-35 at 31. 
41 When certain conditions are fulfilled, anyone born within the territory of the island of Ireland, 
even outside the political boundaries of Ireland (Éire), acquires Irish nationality. 
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applicable to their situation.42 Following the Advocate General, the Court rejected 
this contention, as according to settled Community case-law, “the fact of 
possessing the nationality of a Member State other than the one in which a person 
resides is sufficient to render Community law applicable, even where the person 
relying on those provisions has never crossed the frontiers of the Member State in 
which he lives.”43 The Advocate General added that the only instance in which 
Community law would not be applicable to their situation would be in the case 
that Catherine Chen would not possess Irish nationality; however:  
 
“as regards Community law, the Court has held in its judgments in Micheletti and Kaur 
that ‘[u]nder international law, it is for each Member State, having due regard to Community law, 
to lay down the conditions for the acquisition and loss of nationality’,  and that therefore ‘it is not 
permissible for the legislation of a Member State to restrict the effects of the grant of the 
nationality of another Member State by imposing an additional condition for recognition of that 
nationality with a view to the exercise of the fundamental freedoms provided for in the Treaty’.44 
 
Related to the objection of inadmissibility was the contention by the UK 
that the appellants were not entitled to rely on Community law because Mrs 
Chen’s move to Northern Ireland with the aim of having her child acquire the 
nationality of another Member State constituted an attempt improperly to exploit 
the provisions of Community law, and as such to “illegally to circumvent national 
[immigration] legislation”.45 The Court recognised that Mrs Chen intention was to 
create a situation in which the child she was expecting would be able to acquire 
the nationality of another Member State in order thereafter to secure for her child 
and for herself a long-term right to reside in the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, 
the argument of ‘abuse of rights’ was rejected by the Court because: 
 
“it is not permissible for a Member State to restrict the effects of the grant of the 
nationality of another Member State by imposing an additional condition for recognition of that 
                                                 
42 See Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano in Case C- 200/02, delivered on 18 May 2004, par. 
28. 
43 Id. par. 32 (In reaching this conclusion, the Court and the Advocate General referred to Case C-
148/02, Garcia Avello [2003] ECR I-11613, par. 13 and 27). 
44 Id. par. 38. 
45 Judgment of the Court in Case C-200/02, op. cit. par. 34. 
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nationality with a view to the exercise of the fundamental freedoms provided for in the Treaty […] 
that would be precisely what would happen if the United Kingdom were entitled to refuse 
nationals of other Member States, such as Catherine, the benefit of a fundamental freedom upheld 
by Community law merely because their nationality of a Member State was in fact acquired solely 
in order to secure a right of residence under Community law for a national of a non-member 
country”.46 
 
It is difficult to imagine any other case in which a Member State would 
voluntarily ask the ECJ to usurp the power of the Member States to decide which 
of their nationals can benefit from EU citizenship status, therewith relinquishing 
the sovereign prerogative over recognition of citizenship and opening the way for 
a citizenship status that is not necessarily linked to nationality. It is equally easy to 
understand why the UK did precisely that in the Chen case: suddenly the direct 
link between Irish nationality law and citizenship of the EU affected its powers to 
exclude third-country nationals with possibly far-reaching consequences. In this 
case, the UK seems to have wanted crucial importance accorded to the fact that it 
is immigration legislation that is allegedly circumvented and not any other area of 
the law – in which its line of reasoning would certainly have been much more 
difficult to imagine, because, as the Advocate General observes, the relationship 
between Community law and the laws of the Member States is always such that 
the non-application of a national provision as a result of reliance on a right 
conferred by Community law is merely the normal consequence of the principle 
of supremacy of EC law.47 
The decision in Chen is to be distinguished from the situation in which 
third-country nationals derive free movement rights as family members of EU 
citizens. From early onwards, EC law has been interpreted so as to confer on EU 
citizens that make use of their freedoms under the EC Treaty, the right to be 
joined by their family members, regardless of whether these family members are 
nationals of the Member States or of a third country.48 The right to family 
                                                 
46 Id. par. 39-40. 
47 Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano, op. cit., par. 112. 
48 ECJ, Case C-370/90, The Queen v Immigration Appeal Tribunal et Surinder Singh, ex parte 
Secretary of State for Home Department, 7 July 1992; Case C60/00, Carpenter v. Secretary of 
State for the Home Department, 11 July 2002; and Case C-459/99, Mouvement contre le racisme, 
l’antisémitisme, et la xénophobie ASBL (MRAX) v. Belgian State, 25 July 2002. 
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reunification has also been laid down in secondary legislation.49 However, at 
present it is unclear if and under which conditions a Member State may refuse 
admission of third-country national relatives of EU citizens if they did not enjoy 
prior legal residence in another Member State, an uncertainty which seems to 
have originated in the Court’s decision in Akrich, which ruling is very difficult to 
reconcile with earlier rulings in Carpenter and MRAX.50 Eleanor Spaventa writes 
that decisions by the ECJ in this field seem to have been derived rather from a 
“case-by-case assessment that is very much based on the facts which gave to the 
reference” than from a consistent and hermeneutic approach to EC law.51 The 
legal vagueness surrounding this issues, and the refusal of the ECJ to squarely 
address it in Jia,52 exemplify that in the absence of a common regime regarding 
free movement rights of third-country nationals within the EU, the crossing of 
internal borders cannot be seen in isolation from the delimitation of competences 
between the European Union and its Member States with regard to external border 
crossings and first-admittance decisions. In this sense, competence skirmishes do 
not only concern the relation between the Community and its Member States, but 
they can also lead to considerable confusion as regards the legal framework that 
                                                 
49 Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 29 April 2004, on the right 
of the citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the 
territory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No. 1612/68 and repealing directives 
64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 74/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 
90/365/EEC, and 93/96/EEC, [2004], O.J. L 158/77. 
50 See for more discussion on this: A. Tekofsky, The Power to Control v the Right to Enter: 
Admission of third country national relatives in the case law of the European Court of Justice, 
Challenge Working Paper 192, July 2007, in which the following case law is discussed: Case C-
370/90, The Queen and Immigration Appeal Tribunal v. Surinder Singh, 7 July 1992; Case C-
60/00, Mary Carpenter v Secretary of State for the Home Department; 11 July 2002; Case C-
459/99 MRAX v. État Belge, 25 July 2002; Case C-109/01, Secretary of State for the Home 
Department v. Akrich, 23 September 2003; Case C-157/03, Commission v. Spain, 14 April 2005; 
and Case C-1/05, Jia v. Migrationverket, 9 January 2007. 
51 E. Spaventa, Case C-109/01, “Secretary of State for the home Department v H. Akrich, 
judgement of the Full Court of 23 September 2003, [2003] ECR I-9607”, Common Market Law 
Review 42: 225-239, 2005, at. 238. 
52 Neither does Advocate General Mengozzi in his conclusion of 5 July 2007 in Case C-291/05 
(Minster voor Vreemdelingenzaken en Immigratie v. Eind) take away the uncertainty surrounding 
this fundamental question.  
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addresses the rights of third-country nationals in terms of EC law. This is because, 
as will be dealt with below, EC competence with regard to external border 
crossings is only created within the limited context of Title IV of the EC Treaty, 
which in turn has been characterised as an “institutional ghetto” within that 
Treaty.53 
Internal border crossings and the national quality of persons thus remain 
firmly linked in the EU. For the EU to be “post-national”, it would arguably have 
to deconstruct more radically the link between nationality and entitlement to 
internal free movement. As it is now, for non-nationals of the Member States, 
internal borders are not disappearing at all: national sovereignty is still a factor of 
crucial importance when they want to move from the territory of one Member 
State to another. This is not to say that the creation of the single market has not 
made a difference for them too, caused by the fact that the physical border is free 
of control. But instead of according them more freedom, the absence of these 
controls combined with Member States’ insistence on their exclusionary powers 
vis-à-vis third-country nationals, has led to a situation in which, quoting Malcolm 
Anderson and Didier Bigo, “controls are still there, but now over the whole of the 
territory, although perhaps not applied to everyone, but certainly to persons 
categorised as dangerous and especially as “unwelcome migrants with dark 
skins.”54 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
53 E. Guild and S. Peers, ‘Out of the Ghetto? The Personal Scope of EU Law’, in: EU Immigration 
and Asylum Law, S. Peers and N. Rogers (eds.), Martinus Nijhoff: Leiden and Boston; 2006, pp. 
81-141. 
54 M. Anderson and D. Bigo, ‘What are EU frontiers for and what do they mean?’ in: In Search of 
Europe's Borders, K. Groenendijk, E. Guild, and P. Minderhoud (eds.), The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International; 2002; pp. 7-26, at 18. See also R. Bauböck, Multilevel citizenship and territorial 
borders in the EU polity, Vienna: Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften; 2003 at 7; and 
D. Bigo, and E. Guild, ‘Policing at a Distance: Schengen Visa Policies’, in: Controlling Frontiers: 
Free Movement Into and Within Europe, D. Bigo and E. Guild (eds.), Aldershot: Ashgate; 2005; 
pp. 233-263 at 238. 
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3.2. The Common Immigration Policy and the Borders of the EU and its 
Member States 
   
Before the Treaty of Amsterdam, which made immigration and asylum 
policy a matter of EC competence, co-operation on these matters had for a long 
time been purely intergovernmental. This was largely due to Member States’ 
reluctance to communitaurize an area that was so clearly labelled, both by them 
and their national constituencies, as constituting the core of national sovereignty. 
Nonetheless, from the 1980’s onwards, a certain degree of “Europeanization” of 
migration policies – although not part of the integration process in a formal 
sense55 – had taken place in the form of various forms of trans-national 
cooperation by individual Member States.  
Some authors make a link between the beginnings of European co-
operation and a developing awareness of legal constraints domestically. 
Immigration control authorities found that they had more freedom of action if they 
operated at the European level, where decision-making was largely free of judicial 
checks and public scrutiny.56 Even when at Maastricht, co-operation was 
institutionalised in the third pillar, the situation in which primacy laid with 
national executives remained largely intact: apart from the absence of domestic 
constitutional constraints, there was little scope for action by the Commission, 
European Parliament or the ECJ.57 Thus, in this early phase Europeanization 
provided Member States with an opportunity to reassert national sovereignty with 
regard to control over international movement by turning to the traditional 
                                                 
55 Huysmans, op. cit., at 755. 
56 See A. Geddes, ‘International Migration and State Sovereignty in an Integrating Europe’, 
International Migration, 39(6) 2001, pp. 21-40, at 28; C. Boswell, ‘The external dimension of EU 
immigration and asylum policy’, International Affairs, 79(3) 2003, pp. 619-638, at 623; and V. 
Guiraudon, ‘The constitution of a European immigration policy domain: a political sociology 
approach’, Journal of European Policy, 10(2) 2003. 
57 Boswell, op. cit. at 623. 
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administrative culture of immigration decision-making where the rule of law is 
severely curtailed.58 
When Member States’ concern over immigration had risen sufficiently 
high and dissatisfaction with the intergovernmental approach of the Third Pillar 
emerged, at Amsterdam the Treaty on the European Union was changed in such a 
manner that immigration and asylum were moved from the third pillar to the 
first.59 Increasing immigration pressure on the European Union countries made 
the Member States realise that purely intergovernmental strategies would no 
longer be sufficient to “protect” their national states. Moreover, the absence of 
internal border controls as discussed above made a common stance on 
immigration from third countries seem logically required. The complex manner in 
which the common immigration and asylum policy is shaped, with rules from 
many overlapping sources, opt-in and opt-out provisions for certain Member 
States and forms of policy making which depart from the traditional EC 
legislative process such as the open method of co-ordination is a reflection of 
Member States’ ambiguous feelings regarding loss of exclusive competences in 
this area. Another such example is contained in the special provision for 
preliminary rulings under Title IV that deviates from the normal procedure for 
preliminary rulings. According to Article 68 EC only national courts of last 
instance can refer questions for preliminary rulings to the European Court of 
Justice.60 Furthermore, cooperation between Member States still also takes place 
outside the formal structure of the EU, such as multilateral cooperation between 
several Member States in combating illegal immigration under the Prüm 
                                                 
58 V. Guiraudon and G. Lahav, ‘A Reappraisal of the State Sovereignty Debate, the Case of 
Migration Control’, Comparative Political Studies, 33(2) 2000, pp. 163-195. at 178; Geddes 
(2001), op. cit., at 36; and Geddes (2005,) op. cit., at 788. 
59 A. Duff, The Treaty of Amsterdam, London: Federal Trust; 1997 at 8, 9, 20; and Huysmans, op. 
cit., (2000), at 756. 
60 The Council did not adapt this provision after the transition of the transitionary period that 
expired on 1 May 2004 as required by Article 67(2) EC. See Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social 
Committee, the Committee of the Regions and the Court of Justice of the European Communities, 
Adaptation of the provisions of Title IV of the EC Treaty relating to the jurisdiction of the Court of 
justice with a view to ensuring more effective judicial protection (COM 2006 (346) final, 28 June 
2006). 
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Convention.61 The explicit intention of such cooperation is the transferral of the 
rules the participating states have agreed upon to the level of the EU. Even though 
such intergovernmental cooperation may be motivated by a genuine wish of some 
Member States to achieve closer integration, the inevitable result is that checks on 
the executive power are largely absent: the European Parliament for example has 
no say on the proceedings and outcomes within these multilateral frameworks.  
The measures and policies which have been taken so far as a result of the 
“shift upwards” - denoting the transferring of migration decision making from the 
national to the Community level62 - exemplify that strong emphasis is laid on 
traditional control of the territorial border.63 In spite of the comprehensive 
approach to be taken to migration as was proclaimed indispensable at Tampere,64 
legislation and other instruments such as on harmonising existing practices on 
expulsions,65 mutual recognition of expulsion decisions,66 voluntary repatriation,67 
the organisation of joint flights for expulsion,68 and controlling illegal 
immigration in a more general sense,69 all point to all point to Member States’ 
                                                 
61 Convention on the stepping up of cross border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism, 
cross-border crime and illegal immigration, signed at Prüm on 27 May 2005 (Schengen III). 
Participating states are Belgium, France, Spain, Luxembourg, Austria, the Netherlands, Germany 
and Italy. 
62 Guiraudon and Lahav, op. cit., at 176-177. 
63 Id.  
64 EU Presidency Conclusions Tampere European Council, 15 and 16 October 2001. 
65 Various Recommendations, see for example OJ C 5, 10 January 1996 and OJ C 274, 19 
September 1996. 
66 Council Directive 2001/40/EC, OJ L 149, 2 June 2001 
67 Council Decision 97/340/JHA of 26 May 1997, OJ L 147, 5 June 1997. 
68 Council Decision of 29 April 2004, OJ L261, 6 August 2004, pp. 28-35. 
69 See amongst many other documents: Green Paper on Community return policy for illegal 
residents (European Commission, COM (2002) 175 final, 10 April 2002); Communication from 
the Commission to the Council and Parliament on a common policy on illegal immigration 
(COM(2001) 672 final, 15 November 2001); Council Decision of 27 March 2000 on the improved 
exchange of information to combat counterfeit travel document O.J. L81, 1 April 2000; Council 
Regulation EC/2725/2000 of 11 December 2000 concerning “Eurodac”, O.J. L 316, 15 December 
2000; EU Presidency Conclusions on Justice and Home Affairs of the Laeken European Council, 
17 December 2001; EU Presidency Conclusions to the Brussels European Council 25/26 March 
2004 including the Hague Programme, and Council Decision 2005/267/EC of 16 March 2005 on 
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strong commitment to a rigid territory-identity link. In this respect, it is significant 
that policy making under Title IV of the EC Treaty is strongly unbalanced in 
favour of measures that emphasise security and border control.70 
Apart from an upward shift, Member States have externalised migration 
control through various EU policies, in what can be described as a shift 
“outwards”.71 They have done so in different ways which all lead to a separation 
between the concept of the border and the perimeter of European territory.72 The 
first of such policies is the Schengen system of visa regulation.73 The Schengen 
visa system governs movement of potential migrants in their countries of origin 
instead of at the moment of their arrival at the actual border of the Member States. 
Particularly in combination with carrier sanctions,74 through which private actors 
are made responsible for the typical sovereign act of control over borders, the 
European visa requirements lead to a construction in which control over 
movement is more easily exercised because the extra-territorialisation of such 
control facilitates the evasion of human rights obligations. The regulation of visa 
under Schengen is also indicative of the fact that States are not averse of ceding 
formal sovereignty if they can win back substantive powers of exclusion: 
participating states are under an obligation to refuse entry if the Schengen 
conditions are not met.75 
The stationing of immigration liaison officers in third countries in order to 
prevent irregular migration is another illustration of the extra-territorializing of 
traditional conceptions of territorial sovereignty. Similarly, certain provisions of 
                                                                                                                                     
establishing a secure web-based Information and Co-ordination Network for Member States’ 
Migration Management Services, O.J. L 083, 1 April 2005, pp. 48-51. 
70 G. Papagianni, Institutional and Policy Dynamics of EU Migration Law, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, Leiden and Boston, 2006, at 292. 
71 Guiraudon and Lahav, op. cit. 
72 E. Rigo, Draft Paper: Citizens and foreigners in the enlarged Europe. Implications of 
enlargement for the rule of law and constitutionalism in post-communist legal orders; European 
University Institute, Florence. 28-29 November 2003, at 6. 
73 See more extensively Bigo and Guild (2005), op .cit. 
74 Based upon Art. 26 of the 1990 Supplementation Agreement of the Schengen Convention. 
75 J.D.M. Steenbergen, ‘Schengen and the movement of persons’ in: Schengen: Internalisation of 
Central Chapters of the Law on Aliens, Refugees, Privacy, Security and the Police, H. Meijers 
(ed.), Leiden: Stichting NJCM-Boekerij; 1992 at 65. 
 24 
the Hague Programme, in particular relating to the establishment of a Border 
Control Agency (Frontex), make it possible to organise joint EU-level measures to 
intercept persons travelling on the high seas.76 Frontex has also co-ordinated the 
instalment of patrols in the territorial waters of West African states.77 The intent 
of these patrols, which are carried out under the formal responsibility of 
individual Member States, is clear: prevention of international movement. Spain 
and Senegal reached agreement over joint patrols commandeered by two vessels 
of the Spanish Guardia Civil in Senegal’s territorial waters.78 In August 2006, a 
Portuguese patrol vessel arrived at Cape Verde for a 45-day mission against 
‘illegal’ migration.79 The Spanish-Mauritanian patrols that have been running 
since April 2006 have resulted in the interception of several hundreds of 
emigrants.80 
Other venues for the extension of control and police methods concerning 
international movement consist of shifting responsibility to third countries: “third 
countries are encouraged, or in the case of candidate countries, obliged, to apply 
EU standards of migration management, or to enter into agreements for 
readmitting irregular migrants.”81 Readmission agreements fit very well in the 
global system based on territoriality as discussed above: they are a means by 
which control over movement is exercised as they govern populations both inside 
and outside a state’s territory.82 While such a means of regulating populations 
may be disrupted on the grounds of certain human rights considerations, concepts 
such as safe third country and safe country of origin, now commonly used by all 
                                                 
76 European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of 
the Member States of the EU, Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 of 26 October 2004. ILPA 
in House of Lords (23 March 2003), p. 34. See also European Commission Newsroom 4 August 
2006: “EU common patrols to control maritime borders will be organised shortly in the south 
Mediterranean region.”  
77 Operation HERA II. See also Communication from the Commission to the Council, Reinforcing 
the management of the European Union's Southern Maritime Borders, COM(2006) 733 final, 
Brussels, 30 November 2006. 
78 Source: Reuters, 22 August 2006. 
79 Source: JeuneAfrique, 12 August 2006. 
80 Source: Agence Presse, 14 august 2006. 
81 Boswell, op. cit., at 624. 
82 Walters, op. cit. 
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Member States, attempt to maintain a rigid system of territoriality in which the 
national quality of both persons and territory define the scope for individual 
movement. 
Further proof of the pushing of borders outwards, thereby ‘de-
territorializing territorial sovereignty’, is provided by proposals made by Italy, 
Germany, and the UK, for so-called Transit Processing Centres. These proposals 
were inspired by Australia’s ‘pacific solution’, its asylum policy consisting of 
“patrolling a naval barrier created around Australia’s territorial waters in order to 
prevent unauthorized vessels carrying asylum seekers from entering. Intercepted 
vessels are diverted to offshore processing centres in counties to host [these] in 
return for financial incentives. […] If granted refugee status, the refugees are then 
resettled in third countries.”83 European ideas for Transit Processing Centres 
similarly envisaged the processing of claims that were made in one of the Member 
States outside the territory of the EU, thereby facilitating the contracting out of 
asylum services to third countries.84 It is persuasively argued by several authors 
that significant legal obstacles would be encountered in realising these plans,85 
which perhaps explains why they have not been adopted by the Commission. 
However, Member States seem to think that these obstacles can be evaded if 
camps for illegal immigrants are set up in countries such as Algeria, Tunisia, 
Mauritius, Morocco, and Libya, not under formal supervision of the EU, but of 
these respective countries.86 Increasing co-operation between individual Member 
States and North African countries, such as between Italy and Libya or Mauritania 
and Spain, shows a willingness on both sides to contain the alleged threat of 
                                                 
83 O. Lynskey, ‘Complementing and completing the Common European Asylum System: a legal 
analysis of the emerging extraterritorial elements of EU refugee protection policy’, European Law 
Review 31, 2006, pp. 230-250 at 242. 
84 Id. at 247; and I. Saint-Saens, ‘À Distance,’ Vacarme, 29, 2004.  
85 Lynskey, op. cit.; and G. Noll, ‘Visions of the Exceptional: Legal and Theoretical Issues Raised 
by Transit Processing Centres and Protection Zones’, European Journal of Migration and Law 5, 
2003, pp. 303-341. 
86 D. Helmut, The Desert Front: EU refugee camps in North Africa? Statewatch, March 2005; and 
R. Andrijasevic, How to balance rights and responsibilities on asylum at the EU's southern border 
of Italy and Libya. Central European University (Center for Policy Studies), Open Society 
Institute; 2005, at 15-16. 
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migration on the non-European side of the Mediterranean.87 Such co-operation 
has also been institutionalised within the framework of the EU.88 In 2006, it 
adopted a package of measures to help Mauritania contain the flow of illegal 
immigrants to the Canary Islands.89 In Libya, the European Commission has 
similar projects and a recent visit there led by Frontex aimed at advising the 
Libyan authorities how the EU could best assist with the management of its 
borders.90 The background of such initiatives is a growing unwillingness on the 
part of the EU to deal with the effects of migration on its own soil, but to contain 
the problem in non-Member-States, who are enticed to co-operation with political 
and financial advantages. Although occasionally worded in terms of humanitarian 
concern, Member States use EU cooperation with third countries to export their 
views on territorial sovereignty, even though the situation in these third countries 
is hardly comparable to the situation in Europe. Similarly, plans for regional 
protection programmes,91 even though arguably partly motivated by a genuine 
wish to provide more accessible and effective protection for refugees in their 
                                                 
87 Such as Italy financing the construction of detention camps in Libya. See European 
Commission, Technical Mission to Libya on illegal immigration, 27 November - 6 December 
2004, Report. Brussels: 2005, at 59. Spain has agreed to pay for the construction of detention 
centres for illegal immigrants in Mauritania (Reuters, 17 March 2006).  
88 For example in the Aeneas Programme, Regulation (EC) 491/2004 of the European Parliament 
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migration issues in the European Union’s relations with third countries, European Commission 
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90 See Frontex-led EU Illegal Immigration Technical Mission to Libya, 28 May - 5 June 2007. 
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regions of origin, also fit within a rigid perception of the link between territorial 
exclusion and the foreigner. 
The Treaty of Amsterdam also incorporated policy making in the field of 
legal migration in the Community framework. Article 63(3) of the EC Treaty 
provides that the Council is to adopt “measures on immigration policy within the 
following areas: (a) conditions of entry and residence, and standards on 
procedures for the issue by Member States of long term visas and residence 
permits” In 2001 the Commission presented a proposal for a Directive dealing 
with “the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the 
purpose of paid employment and self-employed economic activities.92 Whilst the 
other European Institutions gave positive opinions, discussion in the Council was 
limited to a first reading of the text93 and currently there is no existing legislation 
pertaining to labour immigration in general nor are there any proposals under 
negotiation,94 despite the fact that the Thessaloniki European Council of 19-20 
July 2003 stressed “the need to explore legal means for third-country nationals to 
migrate to the Union […].”95 In 2005, the Commission presented a Policy Plan on 
Legal Migration, in which it announced the legislative initiatives that it intended 
to take in the then remaining period of the Hague Programme (2006-2009). These 
concern proposals for directives dealing with the conditions and the procedures of 
admission for four selected categories of economic immigrants - highly skilled 
immigrants, seasonal workers, Intra-Corporate Transferees and remunerated 
trainees – and a general framework directive intending to establish which rights a 
third-country national in employment shall enjoy once he/she has been admitted 
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94 Although it should be noted that there is some legislation in place pertaining to legal migration, 
namely Council Directive 2004/114/EC of 13 December 2004 on the conditions of admission of 
third-country nationals for the purposes of studies, pupil exchange, unremunerated training or 
voluntary service, OJ L 375, 23 December 2004, p. 12–18; and Council Directive 2005/71/EC of 
12 October 2005 on a specific procedure for admitting third-country nationals for the purposes of 
scientific research, OJ L 289, 3 November 2005, p. 15–22. 
95 Council of the European Union, Brussels, 1 October 2003, par. 30. 
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to the territory of a Member State.96 However, it is significant that unanimity 
remains the voting rule concerning the adoption of measures in the field of legal 
migration of third-country nationals to the Member States as referred to in Article 
63(3)(a) EC Treaty.97 Thus, despite the fact that Community competence exists 
over important aspects of legal migration, Member States will retain veto power 
in this area in the foreseeable future. As a consequence, also when it comes to 
most venues for legal migration of third-country nationals, the national border is 
all but abolished, a fact which was recently emphasised by commissioner Frattini 
after the High-level Conference on Legal Migration held in September 2007 in 
Lisbon:  
 
“With my future proposals on legal migration, I have no intention of calling into question 
the jurisdiction of any EU Member State, which is the sole authority determining the 
number of migrants admitted onto its territory.”98 
 
 
4. Conclusions: the National Territorial Ideal in Europe 
 
I have argued here that, paradoxically as it may seem, the importance that 
national states attach to the national territorial ideal is exemplified by the 
Europeanization of immigration policy and by the legal framework regulating free 
movement of third-country nationals within the EU. The way in which national 
states have recourse to national sovereignty when it comes to free movement 
rights of third-country nationals within the EU makes that an area without internal 
                                                 
96 Communication from the Commission, Brussels, 21 December 2005, COM(2005) 669 final. See 
also Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, The 
global approach to migration one year on: Towards a comprehensive European migration policy, 
Brussels, 30 November 2006, COM (2006) 735 final, in which the development of a policy on 
labour migration is regarded as an important aspect of the “global approach”. 
97 Recital no. 7 of Council Decision 2004/927/EC of 22 December 2004. 
98 Franco Frattini, European Commissioner responsible for Justice, Freedom and Security, 
“Shaping Migration Patterns”, Speech delivered in the European Parliament, Brussels, 20 
September 2007. See also Article 69b of the Reform Treaty the right of Member States to 
determine volumes of admission of third-country nationals coming from third countries to their 
territory in order to seek work, whether employed or self-employed. 
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frontiers has not truly been established. Internal or national borders, although they 
are now free of physical control, still differentiate between various kinds of 
movement depending on the nationality of the individual concerned. Member 
States’ reluctance to abolish the function of the internal border with regard to 
third-country nationals and the ensuing consequences for the delimitation of 
competences between the EU and its Member States with regard to the admission 
of third-country nationals who are family members of EU citizens has also led to 
inconsistency and inequality in the legal regime regulating their rights of free 
movement.99 We have seen that the motives underlying the Europeanization of 
policy-making regarding immigration into the EU show that the process of 
integration in this field is similarly driven by a deeply felt wish to maintain the 
traditional role of territorial boundaries in protecting the identity of the nation 
state. Law and policy making under Title IV of the EC Treaty has thus far put 
strong emphasis on protecting the territorial border by preventing new arrivals and 
fighting ‘illegal’ migration. The way in which Member States choose to focus on 
integration with regard to the protection of territorial borders, and find it much 
more difficult to achieve integration in the field of legal migration, affirms that 
they prioritise the relation between territorial sovereignty and modern concepts of 
nation and national identity. Similarly, the adoption by the EU of Member States’ 
own security discourse100 when addressing migration signifies an inability to 
break away from traditional perceptions in which immigration is mainly seen as a 
threat to the territorial integrity of the state. 
Precisely the making of a European immigration policy and the shaping of 
a legal framework regulating the status of third-country nationals within Europe 
could have provided an opening to question stubborn and reified notions about the 
link between territorial sovereignty and exclusion of the foreigner. The fact that 
this opportunity has not been grasped is not merely a theoretical issue, but “the 
obduracy of the national border” in Europe deeply influences the rights and 
freedoms of the individual. In the first place, this is so because the perception of a 
self-evident relation between territorial sovereignty and exclusion of the foreigner 
makes that we lose sight of the individual that is actually affected by exclusionary 
                                                 
99 See also A-G Geelhoed in his opinion to the Jia Case. 
100 Kostakopoulou, op. cit. 
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measures in the area of immigration. As the discourse of territorial sovereignty 
dominates the state’s stance on matters relating to immigration, the rule of law is 
only in a very limited number of cases capable to challenge sovereign decisions of 
the state regarding territorial exclusion of the other. This trend of limited 
accountability is much stronger at the European level, where measures relating to 
immigration are often concluded in secret and are difficult to access and control. 
Moreover, the fact that these policies are increasingly taking form at the European 
level makes it more difficult to raise broader public awareness and debate. The 
way in which Member States work together at preventing what they call illegal 
immigration – by intercepting migrants in the coastal waters of West Africa – 
provides a good example of just such tendencies: these practices are barely 
subjected to any democratic accountability, not at all to any form of judicial 
control and public debate concerning the legality of such measures is 
negligible.101 And although some attention has been paid to these practices in 
academic debate, the main focus there has been on the interests of asylum seekers 
and refugees.102 
The fact that the interests of irregular immigrants have mostly been 
ignored raises the impression that intercepting “mere migrants” raises no 
fundamental questions. The recurring emphasis on asylum seekers and refugees in 
critical appraisals of EU policies is understandable in view of their particular 
vulnerable position and need of protection. However, if these appraisals fail to 
address the more fundamental sovereign assumptions that underlie contemporary 
immigration policies in general they run a risk of resulting in an affirmation of the 
dominant discourse in which mere immigration – unqualified by international 
refugee law or a limited amount of human rights – is portrayed as engaging solely 
territorial sovereignty. The result of such a discursive approach to immigration is 
                                                 
101 And although the Reform Treaty introduces the ordinary legislative procedure for measures 
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that most personal interests that are affected by sovereign decisions in this field 
stay largely invisible, a process that is facilitated by keeping the individuals 
concerned far away from us (one of the many logics underpinning police à 
distance) or by portraying them as very different from “us”.  
We can conclude that in the EU, the quintessential function of the 
national/territorial border is not changing, although its location and the manner of 
its enforcement on the individual have been evolving. It has been said in this 
context that Europe reveals “a system of differentiated memberships, framed by 
the norms that identify boundaries at each level of the European polity”103 Indeed, 
whereas before the concept of nationality was the main tool with which to 
distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate movement,104 the EU and its 
Member States have brought about a considerably more sophisticated system of 
maintaining a structure based on territoriality. Concepts such as EU citizens, 
third-country nationals, safe country of origin, safe third country, Schengen, and 
readmission agreements are the constituent elements of this novel structure. 
However, notwithstanding the novelty of the tools, maintaining the self-evident 
link between territorial exclusion and the individual who is defined as the “other” 
is the ratio behind the very existence of that structure. The perceived self-evidence 
of that very link – which has now found a definite place within “Europe” – may 
well be the essence of the nationalism that plays a fundamental role in the self-
understanding of the modern state. 
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